Abstract. As XML has been increasingly important as the Data-change format of Internet and Intranet, access-controlon-XML-properties rises as a new issue. Role-based access control (RBAC) is an access control method that has been widely used in Internet, Operation System and Relation Data Base these 10 years. Though RBAC is already relatively mature in the above fields, new problems occur when it is used in XML properties. This paper proposes an integrated model to resolve these problems, after the fully analysis on the features of XML and RBAC.
Introduction
X ML has been increasingly important as the standard exchange format of Internet and intranet, and the issue of access control on XML properties correspondently gets more and more attention. Some researchers, including Ernesto Damiani, Sabrina De Capitani di, etc, have done some fruitful research on this issue, and brought forward some new questions: level of access control, propagation of authorization, etc. Given these, some new concepts such as DTD-based policy, documen>based policy and fine-level authorization were brought out in Ref. [ 1] , E2 ] and E 3 ].
Meanwhile, role-based access control (RBAC) is an access control technology that came to be mature these ten years. RBAC embodies the "group" in unix, "Privilege grouping" in DBMS and "separation of duty" in early research. The greatest advantage of RBAC is. user submits a request in certain role, and role system maps naturally to the enterprise per sonnel structure. As such, when the personnel changes, all need to do is just to reassign roles to users, rather than up date the access control policy files, which proves to be a hard job. A complete RBAC theory model includes three parts: Core RBAC, Hierarchical RBAC and Constrained RBAC. Ferraiolo, Sandhu and Gavrila made a proposed Standard for role-based access control Ea s~.
We base our work on these two fruitful researches. It fo cuses on some new features and questions when RBAC is applied to XML properties. We carry out a complete solution to these new questions.
The remainder of this paper is organized below: Section 1 describes the special access control problems we concern in XML document; Section 2 carries out an extended access control model and its formal description. Section 3 presents how this new model solve the mentioned problems. Section 4 is the system framework and algorithm, and Section 5 concludes this paper and views the prospect and the future work.
Problems
Traditional access control model is a tri-tuple: subject, object, action ~. For example, in DBMS, "grant select on table scores to UI" is an instance to this model. Though it has been a relatively mature model in I)BMS, it fails to meet the need when applies to XML properties due to XMI.'s features.
Role Reuse
The user-based access control model directly assigns authorizations to given users. This method is able to dis tinguish each user, but it is unable to avoid a mass of unnecessarily repetitious operations, which is just what RBAC tries to avoid. In RBAC, it is roles rather than users that have direct relationships with authorizations. Authorizations are assigned to roles, and roles are assigned to users. In a session, a user submits his requests in certain roles. Thus, users are separated from authorizations by roles. In fact, a role represents the commonness of those users to whom this role is assigned. For example, if a user is a Student, he can query grades. This is the commonness of students, and role Student can represents this commonness. However, the role Student can and only can queries his own grade means the same role may have different authorizations. That is, role may have specialties when assigned to different user.
So, how can roles represent both users' commonness and specialties? That's a problem of reuse of roles.
Conflicts Due to Multiple Authorization Levels
Authorization level is another problem. In DBMS, there are four authorization levels: database level, Table level, field level and tuple level. Since XMI. has two features: one is that every valid XML document has its correspondent DTI), the other is that lags in XML l)ocument are rigorously nested. Given this, we can easily see that there are three levels in access control on XMI.: DTD level, instance level and element level.
Authorization on DTD level means that this authori zation is applied to all valid XMI, documents that are instances of this I)TD. Since every DTI) has a collection of instances, DTD level can avoid authorization on single documents. However, there exists distinction even if two documents are both instances of the same DTD. In this case, we can apply authorization on a much finer level: instance level. Instance level means authorization on a single tag. Since even in the same XML document, some tags are accessible, while others are not, finer levels are needed to solve this problem. That is element level.
Multiple authorization levels may give rise to conflicts. For example, authorization on DTD level may al low some roles to access some data in a document while authorization on this document does not. It's an important issue how to deal with this kind of conflict.
Unnecessary Repetitious Authorizations
In tri-tuple ~subject, object, action~, action commonly refers to read, write, create and delete. In most cases, if a role is granted to write a document, he must obtain the read at first. As such, we have to authorize twice: one for read, the other for write. These two authorizations have the same subject and object, and the only difference is the "action" name. In other cases, system may allow some role to "write" a document, but not allow it to "read". How can we avoid unnecessary repetitious authorizations and at the same time distinguish these two cases?
An Extended Access Control Method for XML Documents
We introduce two new elements to the traditional access control policy tri-tuple ~ subject, object, action ~, making the policy quintuple~tuple. We refer to it as An extended access control policy. Please note that in our new model, subject, object and action can all be treated as tree in logic. For example, an XML document (object) can be treated as a [X)M Tree E~] ; There are inherit ance relationships between roles (subject) and thus form a role tree; and we will import a new concept of "inherit ance of action" and make actions to be an Action Tree. We will explain this tuple in detail below.
Formal description: ()ur extended policy is a quintuple-tuple:~ subject, object, action, conditions, properties~. Where
Subject "' --<role ~ Subject is the roles who submit requests. " § means there is one or more than one role in a access control policy. (the concepts and features of role can be found in Ref. ~2]); Object :: = < ( U R L , X p a t h ) + > Object is the target that subject requests to access. URL is the path and filename of the target file( file may be DTD or some specific XML document); Xpath E77 is the path of the target tag in the target document.
Action "" = <(name, inherit)+ > N a m e " -<read] write I create] delete> Inherit "" = < t r u e ] false> Action is the operation that subject requests to do. Name is the action name, it may be read, write, create and delete; Inherit means whether this action is inherited or not. It has two alternative values, true or false. Conditions =' = <(Bool ] condition)+> Bool'" = < a 
Multiple-Level Access Control Based on Reused Role and Inherited Action
Given the aboveextended policy, we carry out a new access control method, which is called multiple-level access control based on reused-role and inheritable-action. Let's see how this new method resolves the three problems mentioned above.
Resolving the Problem of Role Reuse
We import the concept of "conditions" to solve the 742 problem of "role reuse". Only those who satisfy the conditions can be fit to the policy.
For example, "student can and only can query his own grades", the condition is: uid=Student_id, where uid is the login user's id and student_id is a tag of the target document scores, xml. The request submitted in role of "Student" only returns grades that Student_id equals to the user id.
Another example is "Dean can only check the grades of his own department". Suppose there are two documents: scores, xml records the grades of students, class_ id,course_id and teacher_id are it's attributes; depart ment. xml records information about deparments such as dean_id and class_id. Now a dean role submits a request to query the grades of students. The conditions are: firstly, we check department, xml to find out which department this dean belongs to (uid=dean_id) ; secondly, check whether class_id of target document (scores. XML) belongs to the class_id set of this department. If true, this user (dean) is authorized to query the scores, else the request is refused.
Please note that the importing conditions not only can solve the problem of "Role reuse", but also can sup port much richer semantic expression. For example, "Professor can only modify the grades of students between 8:00 am Jan 1st and 4.00 pm Jan 23th"; "Dean can query the personnel information of his own department only after the secretary log", etc..
Resolving the Problem of Conflict Due To Multiple Authorization Levels
To deal with the conflict of multiple levels, we follow the principle of "finer level takes precedence". This principle means when conflict occurs, authorization on Element level takes precedence over that on instance lev el, and instance level takes precedence over I)TD level.
This principle is quite reasonable, finer level means more explicit and pertinent, so finer level has higher pri ority. Though this principle is proper in most cases, some opposite cases exist, Some authorizations on DTD level are not legal to be covered by authorizations on finer level. This opposite case is quite common in distributed database. To distinguish this two cases, we import two attributes: level and priority. I.evel's value may be DTD or instance, and Instance takes precedence over DTD by default; priority' s value may be hard or soft. Hard means this authorization policy is not legal to be covered, while soft means the opposite.
A question about Element level is: since tags (elements) are nesting, whether authorizations on an element can be applied to its sulo element?
We introduce attribute "propagation", it has two al ternative values: local or recursive. "I.ocal'' means the authorization on this element can not be applied to its sub-elements, while "recursive" means the opposite.
Thus we provide a powerful means to deal with conflicts.
Resolve the Problem of Unnecessary Repeti. tious Authorizations
We introduce a new concept of "inheritance of actions" (see Fig. 1 ). read write delete create
Fig. 1 Hierarchical actions
If operation opl inherits op2 and some role r is granted to opl on some subject, then r is automatically granted to op2 on this subject. For example, if r is authorized to write some object, it can read the same object without another authorization, because write inherits from read. We can thus avoid unnecessary repetitious authorizations.
However, in some other cases, we do not want this kind of automatic mechanism. So we import an attribute inherit, it has two alternative values: true or false. The former means if op2 inherits opl and r is authorized to op2 then r is authorized to opl automatically, and the latter means r is not aulomatically authorized to opl.
Please note that the importing of inheritance of Actions can enable administrators to define more complex and rich-semantic operations. Figure   Fig. 2 shows the architecture of our access control system. Given a request submitted by a user in some role, the performance is by the following four steps: @ Role evaluation evaluates whether this user has the right to submit request in this role. Check whether he is assigned this role or is he submitting another request in a role which has a DTI) relation with this role; @ Access evaluation evaluates whether this role is authorized to execute the action on the target object; In this system, we follow two base rules: 9 Separate roles of administration from roles of users Roles of Administration are those who are in charge of role's definition, assignment, authorization and so on. They are approximately equivalent to DBA in DBMS. Ib separate roles of administration from roles of common us ers also means to separate data about access control (such as roles, xml, policy, xml) from common data (such as scores, xml, department, xml). This is a common rule of access control.
System Architecture and Algorithm

System Architecture
9 Centrally management of roles and policies Role system maps naturally to the enterprise personnel structure and there are hierarchical relationships, SSD and I)SD relationships (Ref. V3~) among roles. So it is nature to manage roles and policies centrally to make the system less error-prone. Especially when RBAC is ap plied on XMI. properties. Because XML is mainly applied in net environment, centrally management of roles and policies can help to keep consistency of data, and at the same time reduce the burden of keeping the data of each local website synchronal.
Algorithm
Request .' : = ~ uid, role, action, object~ >. 1) User u submits a request R(uid,r,act,target). 2) Evaluate whether u has the right to submit request with role of r(Role evaluation) : @ read Users. xml to check whether r or sub-roles of r(roles inheriting from r) is assigned to u, if false, refuese the request, else go to 1.2; @ Read roles, xml and status, xml to check whether u is using other roles which have DTD relationships with r, if true, refuse the request, else go to 2) ;
3) Read policy, xml to find out the matching policy to this request (Access evaluation). @ Let dtd = getDTD(target) childAction = geteh ildAction(act) ; @ Get those policies where role = r, URI=target or URI= dtd, action]-@ name~ = act or action[-@ name~ = childAction(the left of the equal mark are values of tags in policy, xml and the right are values in request R or the returned value of 2. 1). Let the results set is P{ P1 ,Pc, 9 ", p, } (p~ is a piece of policy). If P is null, refuse the request and report this unmatching request to administrators; @ Check the condition of p~, if true, go to 2.4, and else check the condition of p~ 4 1 till p,, ; @ Label the target tags with the sign value of prop erties of Pt, if the value of propagation is recursive, lable all the sub-tags of current tag with the same sing value~ if the target tags or its sulytags have been labled by other policy and conflict arises, follow the rules below: a) If priority value of one policy is hard and the other is soft, choose the sign value of which priority is hard. b) If fails, choose the sign value of which level value is instance. c) If both fail, choose deny and report this unre solved conflict.
Enforce 2.3 till p., 4) Register the status of u and target document (status registration).
5) Execute the requested action.
Conclusion
With the increasingly widely use of XML, the secu rity issue of XML is getting more and more attention. Access control on XML properties is a relatively new issue, while RBAC is a mature access control method. This paper discusses the new problems when RBAC is applied on XML properties and carries out an extended access control method the role-based and inheritable action multiple-level access control, and system architec ture and algorithm.
Our new method has great flexibility to satisfy more complex access control requirement. Our future work is. research when our model is applied to E-commerce what problems will arise and how to resolve these problems.
